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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
In the shadow of 2012 
Decades of debate over the merit of encouraging democratic transitions in 
authoritarian or post-communist states seemed to fall silent in the face of certain 
realities.  One of the most jarring actualities is the flexibility of the term 
democracy, especially when applied across the former Soviet Union.  That 
Russia does not function in the same mold of a classic, western style democracy 
has been obvious for decades.  Perhaps the anticipation of seeing a governing 
system that reflected our own as Russia cast off communism was a form of 
vanity.  The Putin presidency did its best to dispossess the west of this delusion.  
Yet, just as acknowledgment of Russia’s own path, perhaps a sovereign one, to 
democracy begins to take hold (coinciding, unsurprisingly, with a reassessment 
of Russia’s role in certain high-priority situations for the US), there is evidence 
that, for all its distinctive terrain, Russia’s democratic trail might just have familiar 
landmarks after all. 
 
Specifically, the approaching year 2012, with its promise of presidential elections, 
seems to have startled some Russian politicians into downright political behavior.  
First, there is the issue of an agenda for elections.  While President Medvedev 
launched an initiative for reform or modernization of the political system last 
summer, Prime Minister Putin seemed prepared to torpedo the entire idea earlier 
this year in his defense of the system before the State Council. (1) 
 
Lately, however, it appears that Team Putin may find it more advantageous to 
usurp the more promising ideas generated by his tandem partner and the 
Kremlin clan, rather than to bury them.  Perhaps the most notable current 
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example has developed around the new “Innovation City” (sadly, already known 
by the contraction “Innograd”) that is planned for Skolkovo.  While President 
Medvedev announced the creation of the initiative, promoted as a Silicon Valley 
for Russia, it was a close associate of Putin (and one of Russia’s wealthiest 
men), Viktor Vekselberg, who will run the coordinating center for the program.  
(2) Also, it seems the work required to secure foreign innovation and capital for 
Skolkovo will be coordinated with government structures, rather than the Kremlin.  
This has resulted in perks rumored to include a separate police force for the 
“Innograd,” ten year tax breaks, and freedom from bureaucratic interference.  (3) 
In lieu of local government, Skolkovo will be administered by a foundation 
headed by Vekselberg.  Yabloko leader Sergei Mitrokhin sputtered at the 
thought: With the absence of local government, which is in fact unconstitutional, 
activity will be completely out of control.” (4) 
 
It seems that dashing the modernization agenda leaves room for an opposition, 
or at least an alternative, candidate to criticize the government.  So, it seems, 
Putin has been on a campaign to justify, even glorify, the actions of his 
government while extolling new efforts to update programs.  In his annual 
address to the Duma, the prime minister praised the attributes of his government 
in the face of international financial crisis: “Russia responded to the recession as 
a strong state which does not wait until things settle on their own but acts 
decisively and proactively.” (5)  He also referred repeatedly to the modernization 
efforts, in transport, in health care, in production, and in weapons that well may 
mark the core of a 2012 campaign platform. 
 
The emphasis on modernization and innovation naturally brings the connection of 
private and public sectors together, as furtherance of innovation requires capital 
investment, foreign and domestic.  In this regard, the previously noted tax breaks 
and separate—state and local bureaucracy-free—administration should prove 
helpful to the Innograd efforts.  The program also requires cooperation between 
domestic capital and the state, and this well may signal a developing relationship 
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between Russia’s oligarchs and Putin’s cabinet.  While the arrest of Yukos Chief 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky during the Putin presidency signaled a sad twist on state 
engagement with Russia’s oligarchs and entrepreneurs, it seems another new 
era is dawning that may require greater cooperation between the Russian state 
and business – and not the kind of cooperation that witnesses the state’s 
acquisition of private assets.  As Putin noted in his address to the Duma: “We did 
not embark upon the road of nationalisation during the crisis. Strange as it may 
seem, but some businesspeople would like to shift the burden of responsibility to 
the government. Today the expansion of the public sector is totally inappropriate.  
I think that any proposal for the acquisition of assets - both by the federal 
government and by state-owned companies - should require special 
arrangements at the government level, and in any case require a complicated 
procedure in order to prevent excessive nationalisation.” (6)  OK, so that isn’t 
exactly a ban on nationalization, but it may serve as an acknowledgement of the 
problem. 
 
There is one common element to the behavior of both the president and prime 
minister recently that would seem to argue against the proposal of a new found 
concern for the 2012 elections, and that is reflected in their passports:  both Putin 
and Medvedev have spent a great deal of time abroad this month.  While foreign 
policy is not often central to winning elections, their journeys may have been 
useful to shore up the image of Russia as a major player on key international 
issues, such as nuclear policy, or been in furtherance of a Putin fixation with 
multipolarity, such as in his visit to Venezuela.  
 
Whatever the nature of the trip, it is clear that the foreign travel accomplished 
one key goal for both Putin and Medvedev:  it kept them out of the country, just 
as terrorism returned to Russia with a vengeance (and continues at a constant, if 
low-level pace throughout Russia’s provinces in the North Caucasus).  What was 
a perplexing juxtaposition of domestic turmoil with international travel becomes 
clearer in the light of campaign strategy.  If Russia has no solutions to its 
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terrorism problems, it behooves no politician to step forward in that fight. 
Unfortunately, leadership at this crucial moment might be the only weapon that is 
critical to Russia’s struggle against terrorism. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Article by President of the Russian Federation Dmitri Medvedev, "Forward, 
Russia!" Gazeta.ru, 10 Sep 09 via JRL, 11 Sep 09, 2009-#169; “Prime Minister 
Putin defends the political process at a meeting of the State Council,” 22 Jan 10, 
Working Day section of the website of the prime minster of the Russian 
Federation via http://www.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/9065/; See discussion 
of these issues in “Putin steps forward, Medvedev shrinks back,” by Susan J. 
Cavan, The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XVI, No 7 (28 January 2010) via 
www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol16/ed1607a.shtml. 
(2) “The authorities and business: A New Model for the Relationship?” by 
Tatyana Stanovaya, politkom.ru, 29 Mar 10; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 Apr 10 
via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) “Russian ‘Silicon Valley’ to have its own police force and local administration 
– paper,” RIA Novosti, 21 Apr 10, 12:17 GMT+3 (citing Vedomosti) via Lexis-
Nexis Academic. 
(4) “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin delivers a report to the State Duma on 
government performance in 2009,” http://premier.gov.ru, 21 Apr 10 via Johnson’s 
Russia List, 2010-#78, 21 Apr 10. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Legal Issues 
By Sergei Tokmakov 
 
Judicial precedent to strengthen Russia’s top courts 
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The Supreme Arbitration (Commercial) Court has introduced two bills in the 
Duma to implement the principle of binding precedent within the Russian 
commercial litigation system. (1) This means that in certain cases judges 
effectively would have the power to create law and make their interpretations 
binding. Earlier this year, the Constitutional Court basically authorized this 
process by approving the Supreme Arbitration Court’s practice of making its prior 
rulings binding on lower courts. (2) The Constitutional Court has instructed the 
legislature to adopt relevant amendments to procedural law, but strictly limited 
the scope of such amendments. (3) Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court 
Chairman Valeri Zorkin raised concerns that the newly-emerging Russian 
precedent could break the foundations of the judicial system and violate the 
“separation of powers” doctrine. (4) 
 
Formally, Russia is a “civil law” jurisdiction, which means that laws are not as 
open to modification by judges as in “common law” systems, such as that of the 
United States. Despite the fact that precedent is currently not an officially 
recognized source of law, lower courts tend to follow the principles established 
by the supreme courts. This practice existed even under Soviet jurisprudence, 
when only a limited number of the supreme courts’ decisions were published, but 
many judges still followed their natural instincts to comply with them. (5) Now, 
practicing litigators frequently cite cases “for informational purposes only” and, 
while the judges are not required to do so, they tend to follow the patterns 
established by the higher courts. (6) Precedent has some limited official 
recognition in Article 304 of The Code of Arbitration Procedure which gives the 
Supreme Arbitration Court the right to overturn a lower court decision if it 
contradicts other established decisions on similar matters. (7) 
 
Ever since his appointment in 2005, Supreme Arbitration Court Chairman Anton 
Ivanov has been actively implementing the principle of binding precedent to 
strengthen the judicial branch, in order to compensate for “the existing imbalance 
favoring the executive branch.” (8) However, this imbalance can just as likely be 
 6 
exacerbated, since top judges are nominated by the Russian President, and 
Ivanov is a close friend of Dmitri Medvedev. (9) The two were classmates, both 
taught Roman Law at Saint Petersburg State University, then co-authored a 
textbook on civil law and founded a business together. (10)  With Medvedev’s 
help, Ivanov secured Putin’s nomination to serve as the Chairman of the highest 
commercial court in Russia, despite having never served as a judge before. (11) 
President Medvedev has been campaigning for judicial reforms ever since his 
election. Last month, for example, he proposed “simplifying” criminal procedure, 
in light of the recent terrorist acts. (12) 
 
Law professor Yuri Tolstoy, who taught both Ivanov and Medvedev, thinks that 
Ivanov’s activism needs to be closely examined. “Precedent system inevitably 
involves the judiciary infringement into the law-making field, and this destabilizes 
the principle of separation of powers. Considering the current state of our 
judiciary, these are very well-founded concerns.” Former Deputy Chairwoman of 
the Constitutional Court Tamara Morshakova criticized the implementation of 
binding precedent on the grounds that strengthening the supreme courts will 
undercut the constitutional principle of judicial independence in the lower courts. 
(13) Ivanov maintains that uniformity of judicial interpretation must supersede 
judicial independence. 
 
Currently, only the top Russian courts can overturn their own decisions. 
Implementing a precedent system will concentrate more power in the hands of 
those courts, which will make it practically impossible to overcome their legal 
positions. It is also unclear what will happen if the top courts hand down 
contradicting decisions in areas of overlapping jurisdictions. This happened in 
2008, when the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Arbitration Court handed 
down opposite decisions on the same tax law matter. Fortunately, the 
Constitutional Court backed down and its chairman urged the top courts to 
exercise judicial restraint, especially in the areas of overlapping jurisdiction. 
Ivanov proposes to resolve such problems by implementing joint jurisdictional 
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resolutions (agreements) between the top courts and amending the Constitution 
to provide a mechanism for overturning the high court’s decisions in the event of 
an impasse. (14) 
 
Proponents of the precedent system argue that when judges hand down different 
decisions on similar matters, it violates the constitutional principle of equality 
before the law. Also, the existing statutes cannot possibly take into account all of 
the possible twists and ambiguities that real cases present. (15) Proponents of 
the new system also point out that precedents will help protect citizens’ rights 
because irregular decisions, especially politically charged ones, will stand out 
from an established line of similar cases. Thus, it will be easier to overturn such 
irregular cases. These are valid assertions, even though they may significantly 
increase the cost to the defendants in such cases, because precedent adds an 
incredibly dense layer of case law to an already complex body of statutes and 
regulations. Presently, legally savvy citizens are able to ascertain their rights by 
looking up relevant laws and Supreme Court decisions. Navigating through case 
law, however, will require special legal education. Many citizens will not be able 
to represent themselves in court effectively without professional assistance. (16) 
 
Instituting a precedent system will further complicate Russian law, which is 
perhaps an inevitable consequence of the country’s struggle for the rule of law. 
The proposed changes will concentrate power in the hands of the top courts and 
perhaps those of the executive branch, at the expense of the elected legislature. 
This power could be used to reduce corruption in lower courts and improve 
transparency in judicial practice, but the immediate effect would be the increased 
alienation of lay citizens from the legal field. In the absence of effective 
procedures to overturn the top courts’ legal positions, granting them more 
unchecked power could be dangerous. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) Anna Pushkarskaya, “How the Supreme Arbitration Court intends to 
strengthen judicial precedent,” Kommersant, 22 Mar 10 via 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1341235. 
(2) Resolution of the Constitutional Court of Russian Federation as of 21 
January, 2010, official text, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 10 Feb 10 via 
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(3) Olga Pleshanova, Anna Pushkarskaya, “Judicial precedent became 
constitutional,” Kommersant, 22 Jan 10 via 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1307870. 
(4) Anna Pushkarskaya, Olga Pleshanova, “Campaign to advance precedent,” 
Kommersant, 22 Mar 10 via 
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dok.html. 
(10) “Medvedev Dmitry Anatolyevich,” Vesti, 09 Jun 09 via 
http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=291708. 
(11) Vladislav Kulikov, Igor Veletminsky, “Goes to court,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, 27 
Jan 05 via http://www.rg.ru/2005/01/27/arbitrazh.html. 
(12) Sergei Belov, “Judgement day,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta 31 Mar 10 via 
http://www.rg.ru/2010/03/31/prezident.html. 
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(13) “Campaign to advance precedent,” Ibid.  
(14) Ibid. 
(15) Mikhail Moshkin, “Convenient precedent,” Vremya Novostey, 22 Mar 10 via 
http://www.vremya.ru/2010/46/51/249993.html. 
(16) Vladimir Novikov, “Pitfalls of judicial precedent,” RAPSI, 30 Mar 10 via 
http://www.infosud.ru/judicial_analyst/20100330/217225932.html. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Update: MVD reforms 
In the last five months, there has been a significant amount of political attention 
paid to reform of Russia’s Interior Ministry. A Presidential Decree on the subject 
was signed by Dmitri Medvedev in December 2009, mandating meaningful cuts 
in personnel and bureaucracy, and ordering the agency to make real changes in 
its vetting procedures in a declared attempt to weed out corruption.  Interior 
Minister Nurgaliyev apparently was required to report back to the President with 
his reform proposals by the end of March. (1) The concept of Interior Ministry 
reform was introduced before the suicide bombings in Moscow last month. In the 
aftermath of those attacks, it was legitimate to question whether changes in fact 
would be implemented. It now seems that reforms are to go ahead.  
 
On April 2, Kommersant-Vlast’ reported that Nurgaliyev had signed an order 
creating a new “anti-corruption subdivision” within the MVD. The main roles of 
the “Office of the Organization of the Prevention of Corruption and Other 
Offences” will be to “collect, check and make public” details on the income of 
ministry employees, and to approve appointments and promotions. (2) Then, on 
April 7, the Interior Minister appeared on Militseyskaya Volna Police Radio, 
where he announced that personnel cuts would be achieved via the careful 
assessment of staff. Nurgaliyev claimed that individuals would be evaluated 
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based on their “professional, moral and psychological qualities,” and that 
selected personnel would be offered retirement on full pension. (3) During the 
same interview, Nurgaliyev claimed that the MVD would soon place the “concept 
of a future law” on its website, where any citizen would be able to discuss it and 
make comment. The new law is to be presented to the Duma no later than  
December 1, 2010. (4)  
 
At the time of writing, there is no indication in the press that the proposed law has 
been published, and obviously, judgment must be withheld until it can be properly 
analyzed. A legitimate question that can be asked at this time is, who will monitor 
and have enforcement rights over the MVD’s anti-corruption division? Without 
outside oversight in the form of an independent police ombudsman with powers 
of subpoena, investigation and prosecution, it would be naïve to believe that the 
creation of a new bureaucratic department amounts to a real “reform.”  
 
Moscow bombings redux 
On Monday, March 29, in the middle of Moscow’s peak travel hours, two 
explosions occurred in the city’s Metro system. The explosions took place at two 
locations that clearly were selected for their political and military impact: 
Lubyanka and Park Kul’tury, which is located in close proximity to the Defense 
and Foreign Ministries. By the following morning, the fatalities listed amounted to 
39, with a further 70 people injured to varying degrees. The FSB moved quickly 
to portray the bombings as revenge for the death in a special operation less than 
three weeks earlier of Said Buryatsky, a leading militant operating out of the 
North Caucasus. 48 hours after the Moscow attack, two further suicide bombings 
occurred in Kizlyar, Dagestan, in which 12 people were killed. Just as was the 
case in Moscow, one of the blasts was targeted at the FSB, with the first blast 
occurring outside the agency’s regional offices. (5)  
 
The FSB’s aforementioned claim proved incorrect when Doku Umarov claimed 
responsibility in a video on 1 April, insisting that the operation had been carried 
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out in retaliation for the killing of innocent civilians by Russian forces early in 
February. (6) Chillingly, Umarov repeated the warning issued to Russians weeks 
earlier, noting that “the war will come to your streets, and you will feel it on your 
own skins.” (7) 
 
In the two weeks since the bombings some level of detail has emerged both 
about the perpetrators, and about the operation to which Umarov linked the 
attack. On April 3rd, the Russian media reported that the first Black Widow had 
been identified as Dzhennet Abdurakhmanova, (8) the 17-year old widow of 
Umalat Magomedov, a Dagestani Islamist killed on 31 December 2009. A few 
days later, authorities named the second bomber as Mariam Sharipova, aged 29. 
According to the FSB, Sharipova also was a widow, but no information on her 
husband was released at that time. (9) 
 
According to the Human Rights Organization Memorial, Umarov’s reference to 
innocent civilians pertains to the deaths of four teenagers (one aged 16, 3 aged 
19) cut down by Russian commandos while they were out “picking garlic” in the 
woods near the Chechen town of Achkoi-Martan. Memorial alleges that the four 
youths were not killed in a shoot-out, but were executed in cold blood. (10) It has 
been claimed (albeit by Umarov), that the commandos then mutilated the bodies 
with their combat knives (11) As yet, this part of the story is unconfirmed.  
 
At the time of writing, little information has emerged about Moscow’s response to 
the atrocities, and it seems that the lack of detail is deliberate: On April 13, FSB 
Director Alexandr Bortnikov told the press only that Russia’s law enforcement 
agencies had, via cooperative efforts, established the “masterminds” and “circle 
of accomplices” behind the attacks, adding that the “necessary operations and 
search events” to catch or kill these individuals were already underway. (12)  
 
It has been reported that President Dmitri Medvedev signed an order one week 
after the bombings, establishing a “separate permanent” inter-agency anti-
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terrorist action group in the North Caucasus Federal District (13), tasked with the 
“systemic analysis of results of measures to solve terrorist crimes,” in order that 
the “effectiveness” of “joint activities” can be significantly raised. (14)  
 
It is not surprising that little is being said at this juncture about military operations. 
But, from the language used in the Presidential order of April 1, it could be 
deduced that the attack on the Metro was, in part at least, made easier by 
serious intelligence failures, compartmentalization and lack of information sharing 
among Russia’s numerous security or law enforcement bodies. It is an interesting 
question to ask which, if any of the Siloviki will take (or be assigned) 
responsibility, and be forced to fall on their swords or be fired.  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Interior Ministry Reform To Start Soon-Nurgaliyev,” Interfax, 15 Jan 10; OSC 
Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(2) “Russia: In House MVD Anti-Corruption Office Formed, Income Reporting 
Required, Aleksandr Igorev Report: ‘Office of Exclusively Internal Affairs: A Main 
Administration for Monitoring the Income of Employees and Their Career Has 
Been Formed in the MVD’”, Kommersant-Vlast, 2 Apr 10; OSC Translated Text 
via World News Connection. 
(3) “Retirement on Pension To Be Main Tool to Cut Police Staff-Nurgaliyev,” 
ITAR-TASS, 8 Apr 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(4) “Interior Ministry To Put Up Concept of New Police Law on Its Site,” ITAR-
TASS, 7 Apr 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(5) “Twelve Killed by Twin Bombings in Russia’s Dagestan,” BBC News, 31 Mar 
10 via www. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8596084.stm.   
(6) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XVI, Number 11, Part 1 (1 April 2010). 
(7) “My Black Widows Will Have More Blood: The Chechen Mastermind Of Last 
Week’s Moscow Metro Bombings Is Warning Russia That they Were Just the 
Start,” The Sunday Times (London), 4 Apr 10 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(8) “Moscow Bomber Was 17-year Old Bride of Extremist,” The Daily Telegraph, 
3 Apr 10 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) “Russian Investigators Identify Second Suicide Bomber in Moscow Metro 
Blasts,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 6 Apr 10; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) “Massacre In Woods That Brought War to Moscow: Luke Harding Reports 
from Ingushetia on the Murder of Four Teenagers that Inspired this Week’s 
Deadly Bombings,” The Guardian, 3 Apr 10 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) “FSB Establishes Identities of Moscow, Kizlyar Blasts Perpetrators,” ITAR-
TASS, 13 Apr 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(13) “Medvedev Signs Antiterrorism Orders,” ITAR-TASS, 7 Apr 10; OSC 
Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(14) “Russia Sets Up Anti-Terror Operations Group in North Caucasus,” Interfax, 
19 Apr 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Andrew Wallace (USAF) 
 
Challenges to Russia’s Air Force reform 
The Russian Air Force has undergone significant reform over the past year.  
Earlier this month Colonel General Alexander Zelin, the Air Force Commander in 
Chief described the transformed organization as a “qualitatively new service” of 
the Armed Forces. (1)  Major components of the reform effort included a new 
command structure, consolidated logistics and modernized weapons.  Despite 
the service’s progress, serious questions remain regarding the leadership of the 
officer corps, inter-service rivalry and the ability of the defense industrial complex 
to deliver high-tech weapons systems.   
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The Russian Air Force, like the Army, completed major organizational reforms in 
2009.  The new command structure includes 7 operational commands, 30 air 
force bases and 10 air defense brigades. (2)  Newly acquired military 
transportation aviation, airborne troop’s aviation and army aviation are now 
included in the new structure. (3)  According to Colonel General Zelin the 
transformation created a more “flexible” structure that is “better able to adapt to 
rapidly changing situation[s].” (4) 
 
So far, the integration of military airlift has shown statistical improvement.  In 
2009, air transportation executed 25,000 hours and airdropped 41,000 soldiers, 
up 16% and 50% respectively from 2008. (5)  In addition, the command resumed 
resupply missions to the Russian Arctic base “Borneo” for the first time in 20 
years. (6) 
 
The air force also took steps to consolidate its aviation and air defense logistics 
systems.  On the aviation front, the air force plans to convert its aircraft 
maintenance activities into a holding and management company. (7)  It further 
plans to consolidate its air defense maintenance and supply at one central 
facility. (8)  The air force expects the new look logistics structure to be a more 
efficient and economical maintenance system. (9)  
 
The new maintenance system should be well suited to manage a more modern 
inventory of weapon systems.  According to General Zelin, the air force will need 
to modernize 70% of the service’s equipment by 2020. (10)  So far, Russia’s 
struggling defense industry retains a viable aviation and air defense sector.  
According to Prime Minister Putin, the aviation and air defense sector alone 
account for 60% of the nation’s defense industry exports. (11)  Consequently, the 
expectation is that the industry should be able to meet the service’s 
requirements.  
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Leading indicators are promising with Russia’s fifth generation fighter starting test 
flights earlier this year, (12) and the S-500 air defense system projected for 
completion in 2012. (13)  In addition, Strategic Aviation Commander Major 
General Zhikharev stated, the defense industry was working on the next 
generation strategic bomber to replace aging Tu-95 “Bear” bombers starting in 
2025. (14) 
      
Although the Air Force has made notable progress instituting reform, serious 
challenges remain.  In a recent interview, General Zelin summed up the air 
force’s inspection cycle for 2009 as “positive.” (15)  However, he did say 
inspectors identified major shortcomings in the “professional know-how” and 
“skills of the officer corps.” (16)  Specific weak areas included insufficient 
planning and follow-up by unit commanders, imprecise orders and personal 
incompetence. (17)  General Zelin will need the officer corps to lead at a much 
higher level if he expects to institutionalize the recent reforms. 
 
Another challenge the air force will have to manage stems from the consolidation 
and transfer of army aviation resources to the air force.  Inter-service concerns 
and rivalries undoubtedly will arise due to the change of asset ownership.  Army 
commanders, who once possessed their own military airlift or combat aviation 
resources will now have to request that same capability from their sister service.  
It will be up to the air force to prioritize and fill an army commander’s requests.  
Army stakeholders are already speaking out.  Colonel General Pavlov, former 
commander of army aviation recently stated, “Clearly Air Force command neither 
want[s] nor can deal with helicopters.  Before army aviation falls to pieces 
completely, it should be restored to the ground troops.” (18) 
 
Finally, despite the defense industry’s relative success in the aviation and air 
defense sector, serious concerns remain.  In March, President Medvedev called 
the task of providing the armed forces with new weapon systems “extremely 
difficult." (19) Specific technology shortfalls include the development of a new jet 
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engine, modern electronics and new onboard radar for the Russia’s fifth 
generation fighter in order to field the system by 2015. (20)   Another technology 
shortfall exists in the development of the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
(UCAV).  So far, over 5 billion rubles in research and development have been 
expended by the defense industry without producing a single viable design.  In 
fact, General Zelin said it would be “a crime” to include any defense industry 
UCAVs in the air force inventory. (21)  
 
The defense industry also has failed to field an automated net-centric command 
and control system for the armed forces.  The industry’s current troubled effort 
“Akatsiya,” rumored to enter service later this year, will cost the armed forces one 
trillion rubles to field. (22)  Already defense experts are making the comparison 
with Bulava and Glonass, two other costly and struggling defense industry 
programs. (23)   
 
The air force does not possess any quick fixes for the defense industry’s 
technological shortfalls.  However, it can address both its leadership failures and 
its inter-service rivalry with the army.  In both cases, General Zelin will play a 
pivotal role in determining the ultimate success or failure of the air force’s effort.   
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Col-Gen Zelin Sees Air Force as Basis of Russia’s Future Air and Space 
Defense, Krasnaya zvezda Online, 13 Apr 10; OSCE Translated Excerpt via 
World News Connection. 
(2) Russia: Chief of Main Staff Views Air Force’s 2009 Achievements, Changing 
Role, Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer Online, 9 Apr 10; OSCE Translated 
Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(3) Russia: Military Transport Aviation Gets New Missions, Equipment, Units, 
Krasnaya zvezda Online, 13 Apr 10; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News 
Connection. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Smolensk, Katyn and Russian-Polish relations in the post-Soviet era 
On April 10, 2010, Polish president Lech Kaczynski and 95 others, including 
prominent members of Poland’s political, military, and financial establishments, 
were killed when their plane crashed during landing in Smolensk, Russia. 
President Kaczynski and his delegation had been en route to attend the 70th 
anniversary commemoration of the Stalin-era massacre of Polish officers outside 
the village of Katyn. This shocking incident has suddenly thrust into the spotlight 
an old topic that, on the whole, has seen comparatively little attention in recent 
times, namely the relationship between two historically significant Slavic 
countries, Poland and Russia. Even before the victims were laid to rest, 
speculation began in the media about what impact this tragedy will have on the 
course of Russo-Polish relations. While opinions differ on whether the crash will 
bring the two countries closer together or propel them farther apart, what appears 
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certain is that the events of April 10 have caused the respective leaderships to 
place greater emphasis on relations with their counterparts than they have in 
quite some time. 
 
The official Russian reaction to the April 10 plane crash was an expression of 
sympathy and goodwill that surprised most observers, especially many Poles. On 
the day of the crash, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that he would 
personally take charge of the investigation of the accident, and then flew out to 
the crash site—a former base for military transport aircraft that has been used in 
recent years by visiting politicians—to meet personally with his Polish 
counterpart, Donald Tusk. A video of this impromptu ceremony, conducted in 
darkness, shows the two prime ministers each laying flowers at what appears to 
be a piece of fuselage from the wrecked Tu-154, then briefly embracing. (1) 
Afterwards, in his public statement, Putin called the crash a tragedy for Poland 
and “our tragedy as well.” (2) For his part, President Dmitri Medvedev promptly 
telephoned the Speaker of the Polish Sejm Bronislaw Komorowski, who had 
been appointed acting president, to express condolences. Medvedev then 
delivered a televised address to Polish audiences not only expressing sympathy, 
but declaring Monday, April 12 as a national day of mourning – an 
unprecedented act – never before in Russian history had a day of mourning been 
declared for foreign victims of a tragedy. (3) On the day of mourning itself, 
Medvedev along with other prominent figures including Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov, chairwoman of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Institutions and 
Human Rights Ella Pamfilova, and former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev 
laid flowers at the Polish embassy in Moscow and lit candles in memory of the 
crash victims. (4) It also was announced that Medvedev would attend the funeral 
service for Kaczynski and his wife, Maria, on Sunday, April 18 in Krakow, and 
these plans were not changed, despite the travel disruptions caused by the 
volcanic ash cloud from Iceland. Medvedev's presence at the funeral highlighted 
the absence of US President Barack Obama, French President Nicholas Sarkozy 
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and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. (5) As a result, Medvedev was by far the 
most significant international figure to attend the funeral. 
 
Parallel to the official expressions of condolences by Moscow, there was a public 
wave of sympathy. The day of the crash, local residents of the Smolensk area 
arrived at the accident scene with flowers. This scene was repeated over the 
next several days near Polish embassies in Moscow, Kaliningrad and other 
Russian cities. (6) The Kaliningrad region, the only part of Russia that borders 
Poland, even held a memorial concert for the crash victims. (7) 
 
In general, the mood among prominent figures in Poland, alongside the shock 
from the traumatic events, was one of goodwill toward Russia, expressed both 
through their gratitude for the outpouring of sympathy, as well as the hope for 
improvement in relations between the two countries. Acting President 
Komorowski called for "unity with the Russian nation," while Cardinal Stanislaw 
Dziwisz, archbishop of Krakow, was even more emphatic, referring to Russians 
as "brothers" and addressing the Russian president personally. (8) Even Foreign 
Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, who had previously referred to the Nord Stream 
project between Russia and Germany as the "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pipeline,"(9) 
declared that an "emotional breakthrough" had occurred between Russia and 
Poland and praised what he called Russia's "Slavic openness." (10) The theme 
of common Slavic heritage was sounded repeatedly in both countries as a basis 
for reconciliation and unity. Suspicion of Russian involvement in the crash was 
marginal in official circles and mainstream Polish media. One Sejm deputy, Artur 
Gurski, who had voiced some suspicion of foul play shortly after the crash, later 
issued a statement withdrawing his remarks, attributing them to the strong 
emotions he felt in light of the accident and its tragic irony. (11) Perhaps the lack 
of support for a conspiracy theory can be attributed partly to the magnitude of the 
event, and partly by the extraordinary openness exhibited by Moscow, which 
seems to have caught even traditionally wary Polish figures, such as Sikorski, by 
surprise. 
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Perhaps the most striking aspect of Moscow's reaction to the April 10 tragedy 
was the extent to which Russian leaders have been willing to open the theme of 
the Katyn massacre itself. In his televised address, Medvedev candidly stated 
that the Polish prime minister had perished while on his way to commemorate 
Polish officers who had become victims of a totalitarian regime. (12) And on 
Sunday, April 11, a day after the crash, Andrzej Wajda's 2007 film "Katyn" was 
aired on Russia’s Channel 1. Nevertheless, evidently uncomfortable with 
excessive dwelling on the Soviet past, Medvedev, speaking at Kaczynski's 
funeral, appeared to feel a hint of frustration toward the topic, stating that 
Russia's position on the Katyn issue has been clear for a long time and has 
remained unchanged. (13) 
 
Still, the combination of Russia's expression of sympathy and relative recent 
openness on Katyn appears to have produced a genuinely positive reaction in 
Poland. In fact, relations between the two countries already had begun to 
improve, albeit slowly, in the past year. It was Putin who seemed to have taken 
the initiative to delve into the subject, first by attending the anniversary of the 
beginning of the Second World War in September 2009, and more recently by 
attending the Katyn ceremony together with Polish Prime Minister Tusk. Putin’s 
remarks on these topics have been a mixed bag, including his condemnation of 
the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact as “immoral,” managing to mention Poland’s 
cooperation with Nazi Germany, but at the same time praising Polish soldiers for 
their bravery. He also has condemned the Katyn massacre, but suggested that it 
may have been motivated by Stalin’s desire to exact revenge for the deaths of 
Red Army POW’s in Polish camps during the 1920’s, thereby implying that it 
might really have been the Poles’ fault. This is not exactly the kind of recognition 
that most Poles would have hoped for, but at least to some, including Tusk, it 
was a step in the right direction. For the time being, it appears that the latest 
tragedy at Smolensk has served to increase the momentum towards Russo-
Polish rapprochement. If nothing else, it has resulted in a level of official contact 
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between the two countries that has not been seen in a long time. Overall, 
however, the impact of the April 10 crash on Russo-Polish relations will be 
difficult to assess fully until the upcoming Polish presidential and parliamentary 
elections this summer.   
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Gazprom vs. shale gas: The best laid plans of titans and men 
When energy prices peaked in July 2008, Russia’s ascendance to energy 
superpower status was pronounced a fait accompli, thanks to its national 
champion, the state gas monopoly Gazprom, which that year achieved 
unmatched output accounting for around 17 percent of total world gas 
production. (1) During the past decade, Gazprom emerged as a titan among 
multinational energy majors by seizing a commanding share of the international 
gas trade concentrated mainly between Russia and Europe, an export strategy 
that the company has sought to expand through its recent efforts to gain a 
foothold in dynamic markets farther afield. Among other prospective customers, 
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Gazprom targeted US markets for Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments 
and, in 2006, the company announced its intention to supply ten percent of US 
gas needs by 2010. (2) That ambition failed to materialize. Instead, in 2009, the 
US overtook Russia to become the world’s leading gas producer, thanks to new 
drilling technologies that have transformed US natural gas production in the past 
five years, raising the country’s proven reserves by around 40 percent. (3) 
 
The shift in US production has been quite literally tectonic, as new methods of 
extraction access natural gas deposits trapped in dense beds of shale rock miles 
underground. Hydraulic fracturing technology, which uses an emulsion of water, 
sand and chemicals to crack shale rock, marks an advance in gas production 
that is being hailed as “the biggest energy innovation of the decade,” by Daniel 
Yergin, chairman of the Cambridge consulting group, who marvels at the fact that 
the industry missed the eureka moment of the new technology: “there was no 
grand opening ceremony for it. It just snuck up.” (5) 
 
Despite its quiet arrival, shale gas already has had a significant impact on the 
international gas trade. Around 20 percent of US natural gas production is 
attributed to shale gas, representing an overall increase in supply that has 
saturated the national energy market. While the US domestic market eventually 
will absorb the majority of new supply, there are signs that the gas glut is 
spreading to global energy markets, as LNG shipments originally destined for the 
US divert their cargoes to other ports. European countries have become prime 
destinations for these additional gas supplies, because they have the 
infrastructure to convert LNG for domestic use. Thus, it is in Europe, where 
successive years of reduced demand in the recessionary period, coupled with 
the recent abundance of LNG deliveries, that a gas glut has emerged on a 
magnitude capable of jeopardizing Gazprom’s position as a leading energy 
supplier to regional markets. (6) Among Gazprom’s key customers, the glut is 
pushing spot prices for LNG far below the price of Russian gas, pegged to crude 
oil prices. (7) European consumers operating under long-term supply contracts 
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with Gazprom have begun to tamp down their use of comparatively more 
expensive Russian gas, in order to take advantage of the recent influx of cheap 
energy. (8) 
 
One tantalizing possibility raised by the advent of shale gas is the promise of 
energy independence it holds for Poland. The country presently gets over 70 
percent of its gas supplies from Gazprom, yet customers in Poland harbor deep 
mistrust for the gas giant that they regard as a coercive arm of the Kremlin. (9) 
Poland’s leaders, eager to recreate an American-style shale gas bonanza in 
Eastern Europe, have welcomed US cooperation in what they hope will become 
a transformative energy initiative. “Production of shale gas in Europe can change 
its energy paradigm,” Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski told US envoys. 
(10) This spring, US energy majors began exploratory drilling in Poland’s shale 
beds, where they hope to confirm estimates that put Polish shale gas reserves at 
three trillion cubic meters, an amount equal to 200 years’ of domestic supply. 
(11) Such a significant find would give Poland the resources it needs to replace 
its primarily coal-burning power plants with gas-powered plants, enabling the 
country to reduce its CO2 emissions, and may even present an opportunity for 
Poland to become a net gas exporter to its European neighbors. 
 
As an incidental matter, the advent of shale gas production has raised the profile 
of the international LNG trade and highlighted the capacity of LNG exporters to 
respond to abrupt shifts in the global gas market. Whereas consumers who 
receive gas deliveries via pipelines are constrained from taking advantage of the 
current resource oversupply and attendant fall in commodity prices by fixed, oil-
indexed contracts, the exporters and importers who trade in LNG volumes meet 
short-term needs on spot markets where the price of gas, uncoupled from the 
price of oil, offers a fair reflection of prevailing global market conditions. Of 
course, the high degree of flexibility that characterizes the LNG trade could give 
leading gas exporters the leeway they need to form an OPEC-like cartel that 
seeks to drive up global energy prices. Algeria raised the idea of coordinating 
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production levels as a means of solving the global supply glut and stabilizing 
weak gas prices at a recent meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, a 
group of the world’s biggest gas producers, but the proposal was nixed by other 
members, including Russia’s Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, who dismissed 
the idea of cutting pipeline deliveries or LNG supplies as impossible. (12) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the reaction of Gazprom officials to the advent of shale gas 
production has been decidedly wary. Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander 
Medvedev has attacked shale gas projects as “dangerous” and found it 
“unimaginable” that Europe would permit shale gas production, which, he 
suggested, might contaminate drinking water. (13) In a different vein, Medvedev 
tried to put a brave face on current events by predicting that gas prices will 
rebound on a rising economy in 2012. Although most industry experts do not see 
the gas glut drying up anytime before 2015 and do not endorse his rosy 
prognosis, Medvedev announced company plans to boost Gazprom’s output to 
record levels year-on-year for the next three years, in anticipation of a complete 
turnaround of European markets. (14) Behind the bully forecast, Gazprom has 
been quietly adjusting its strategy to uncertain market conditions, renegotiating 
agreements to phase out imports of Turkmen gas, and postponing several major 
new gas field projects, including the long-anticipated development of the 
Shtokman and Bovanenkovo gas fields, that Gazprom will soon depend upon to 
meet its supply commitments in coming years. (15) The company’s decision to 
defer investment in new gas field development, in order to finance and build a 
new pipeline that it will use to deliver gas to established markets with relatively 
inelastic demand, as it has done with its recently-launched Nord Stream pipeline 
to Western Europe, suggests that Gazprom’s attention is focused on securing 
long-term delivery commitments with European customers, rather that scanning 
the horizon for new markets to conquer. For energy industry observers who 
came to know Gazprom as an indomitable industry titan in former years, the 
company today seems somehow diminished, even less inclined to rattle its 
neighbors. Perhaps the company is mirroring the depressed natural gas market, 
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or simply consoling itself for its failure to anticipate the shale gas phenomenon 
that has cost it a potential new market and allowed US producers to challenge its 
global standing.  
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